Abstract. In this paper, we introduce the first protocols for multiparty, privacy-preserving, fair reconciliation of ordered sets. Our contributions are twofold. First, we show that it is possible to extend the round-based construction for fair, two-party privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets to multiple parties using a multi-party privacy-preserving set intersection protocol. Second, we propose new constructions for fair, multi-party, privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets based on multiset operations. We prove that all our protocols are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. We furthermore provide a detailed performance analysis of our new protocols and show that the constructions based on multisets generally outperform the round-based approach.
Introduction
Recently, protocols were proposed that allow two parties to reconcile their ordered input sets in a privacy-preserving and fair manner [13] . Fair reconciliation of ordered sets is defined as a protocol that allows two parties whose input sets are ordered according to their individual preferences to determine those inputs the parties have in common that additionally maximize a specific combined preference order. Many applications of such fair, privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols exist and range from simple scheduling applications to the reconciliation of policies in Future Internet architectures [13] . Specifically, this work will enable a fair and privacy-preserving version of Doodle [4] . Currently, Doodle allows several parties to schedule a meeting in a distributed and efficient manner. However, today's Doodle application does not allow the parties to order the time slots at which they would be available for the meeting according to their preferences. Furthermore, all parties see which time slots were (not) selected by the others. In this context, our work allows an extension of Doodle which will take the preferences of all parties into account when determining the best time slot for the meeting. In addition, the advanced Doodle will keep the settings of all parties private. I.e., neither the information on what time slots were (not) selected nor a party's corresponding preferences will be disclosed to the others.
The protocols introduced in [13] are designed for two parties. The maximizing of the parties' individual preferences is achieved by carrying out privacypreserving set intersection protocols on specifically chosen input sets in a particular order. This order directly corresponds to the combined preference order itself. In this context, our contributions in this paper are twofold. We first show that it is possible to extend the round-based construction of [13] to the multi-party case using the multi-party private set intersection protocol introduced in [10] . Furthermore, we propose a new more efficient construction for fair, multi-party, privacy-preserving reconciliation protocols of ordered sets. The core of the new construction is an intricate encoding of both the parties' input sets and their associated preferences. This encoding is based on multisets. The new protocols integrate the intersection, union, and element reduction operations on multisets, which were first introduced in [10] . We prove that the protocols for both of our constructions are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. In addition, we provide a performance analysis of our new protocols with respect to communication and computation overhead and show that for more than six parties the construction based on multisets outperforms the round-based approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss related work. Section 3 briefly reviews basic components used in our constructions. Section 4 details our new round-based and multiset-based constructions. In Section 5 we provide a performance analysis of the two new constructions. We close the paper with some remarks on ongoing and future work.
Related Work
The basis of work for this paper is preference-maximizing privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets. Two-party protocols for this type of operation were introduced in [12] . [13] further develops these protocols and shows that it is possible to construct two-party protocols that are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model from any privacy-preserving set intersection protocol such as [1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 5] . The two-party protocols described in [12, 13] use several rounds of computing the intersection of input sets of the two parties. The input sets in these rounds are chosen such that upon termination of the protocol only one preference-maximizing common set element is revealed to each of the parties. The detailed protocol descriptions in [12, 13] are based on [5] which uses oblivious polynomial evaluation for computing the intersection of two private datasets in a privacy-preserving manner.
Compared to [12, 13] our main contribution is the generalization of the protocols to multiple parties. Specifically, we suggest two new constructions that achieve this generalization. The first one leads to a round-based construction that uses a multi-party private set intersection protocol such as [10, 11, 14, 15] in each round. We describe this round-based construction and analyze its performance in terms of the total number of runs of the multi-party private set intersection protocol required. In addition, we show that our multi-party roundbased constructions are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model.
The second multi-party construction introduced in this paper makes use of the results on private multiset operations and protocols introduced in [10] . Here, multisets refers to sets in which elements may occur more than once. The authors of [10] specify algorithms for privacy-preserving operations not only for the intersection of multisets but also for the union of multisets, and for element reduction. In addition, they show that based on these operations, any function over multisets that can be expressed by the grammar
can be computed in a privacy-preserving manner. Furthermore, the authors describe protocols for (cardinality) set intersection (S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n ) and different forms of threshold set union (Rd t (S 1 ∪ ... ∪ S n )). They prove the security of their protocols in the semi-honest as well as the malicious model [10] . In addition, they analyze the communication overhead of their protocols. Compared to [10] the main contribution of this paper is the idea to encode the rank of an element in an ordered input set such that the rank corresponds to the number of occurrences of that element in a corresponding multiset and to show that the preference-maximizing objectives can be expressed in the above grammar. For these particular functions no detailed description of a privacypreserving protocol is provided in [10] . We therefore specify these new multiparty protocols in detail. In addition, we provide a detailed analysis of both the communication and the computation overhead of our new protocols and show that they are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model.
Preliminaries

Ordered Sets and Preferences
Throughout this paper, we consider n parties P 1 , ..., P n with input sets R 1 , ..., R n chosen from a common domain R. Each input is a set of k elements, r i1 , ..., r ik . Each element r ij of party P i is represented as a bit-string of length m. Furthermore, we assume that each party can totally order the elements in its input set R i according to its preferences. The rank of an element r ij is determined by rank Pi (r ij ) = k − j + 1 (j = 1, ..., k) which is a bijective function that induces a total order ≤ Pi on R i . The most preferred element has the highest rank. The goal of the parties is to not only determine the elements they have in common but determine those shared elements which maximize their combined preferences. Analogously to the definition in [13] , we define a preference order composition scheme for n parties as follows: In the remainder of this paper we focus on two specific preference order composition schemes, namely the minimum of ranks and the sum of ranks composition scheme.
Definition 2. The minimum of ranks composition scheme is defined by the real-
valued function f (x) = min{rank P1 (x), ..., rank Pn (x)} for x ∈ R 1 ∩ ... ∩ R n .
Definition 3. The sum of ranks composition scheme is defined by the realvalued function
In the Doodle application, the parties' input sets would consist of (possible) time slots (e.g., a date associated with a time) which are additionally ordered according to the parties' preferences. Using the sum of ranks composition scheme will then yield a common time slot which is in total most preferred among all participating parties. The minimum of ranks composition scheme will yield a common time slot in which the least assigned preference is maximized.
Homomorphic Cryptosystem
Our protocols require a threshold version of a semantically secure, additively homomorphic, asymmetric cryptosystem.
Additively Homomorphic. Given the ciphertexts c 1 = E(m 1 ) and c 2 = E(m 2 ), the encryption of the sum of the plaintexts E(m 1 + m 2 ) can be determined with an operation + h in the ciphertext domain knowing only the ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 as E(m 1 + m 2 ) = c 1 + h c 2 . This can be further generalized. Given a ciphertext c = E(m) and a scalar value s, the encryption of the product m·s can be determined by applying the operation × h s times in the ciphertext domain using only the ciphertext c as
Threshold Decryption. For an (n, n)-threshold cryptosystem with n parties, the private key k priv is shared among the n parties with each party P i holding a private share s i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Given a ciphertext c = E(m), the n parties must cooperate in order to decrypt the ciphertext c. The threshold decryption of c requires each party P i to use its private share s i of the private key k priv . One example for a suitable system that is semantically secure and additively homomorphic, is the threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem [2] .
Prior Results on Two-Party Preference-Maximizing Protocols
The protocols in [13] introduce fairness in the reconciliation process of two ordered input sets for the two preference composition schemes defined above. Each set element is associated with a preference that corresponds to its rank in the ordered set. Upon protocol termination, both parties have learned nothing but the set element that maximizes the combined preference order. The protocol works as follows.
The protocol consists of multiple rounds. In each round, all pairs of set elements are compared according to the combined preference order. For the sum of ranks (minimum of ranks) composition scheme, there are up to 2n − 1 (respectively n) rounds. The order in which the set elements are compared guarantees that if a match is found, it is the maximum according to the chosen combined preference order. In each round, a set element is interpreted as a root of a polynomial. The set intersection is then calculated in a privacy-preserving manner using oblivious polynomial evaluation as introduced by Freedman et al. [5] . It is furthermore shown in [5] that the protocols can be generalized to use any arbitrary two-party privacy-preserving set intersection protocol.
Prior Results on Multiset Operations
Kissner and Song [10] specify privacy-preserving algorithms for the computation for three operations on multisets: intersection (∩), union (∪), and element reduction by t (Rd t ). In addition, they show that based on these operations, any function over multisets that can be expressed by the grammar in equation (1) . can be computed in a privacy-preserving manner. Here, S i is a multiset of a participating party P i and t ≥ 1. Note that the union operation can only be computed if one of the two operands is known to some party P i .
The
I.e., an element appearing y times in the multiset S i is a yfold root of the corresponding polynomial f .
Polynomial Operations. The operations union, intersection, and element reduction on multisets in [10] are based on operations on the polynomials representing them.
Union. The union S 1 ∪S 2 of two multisets S 1 and S 2 (represented by polynomials f 1 and f 2 respectively) can be expressed by the multiplication of the polynomials as f 1 * f 2 . Each element a appearing y 1 times in S 1 and y 2 times in S 2 with y 1 , y 2 ≥ 0 occurs y 1 + y 2 times in the resulting multiset.
Intersection. The intersection S 1 ∩ S 2 of two multisets S 1 and S 2 (represented by the polynomials f 1 and f 2 of degree d respectively) can be expressed by the polynomial f 1 * r + f 2 * s, where r, s are random polynomials of degree d. Each element a appearing y 1 times in S 1 and y 2 times in S 2 with y 1 , y 2 > 0 occurs min{y 1 , y 2 } times in the resulting multiset.
Element Reduction. The reduction Rd t (S) (by t) of a multiset S represented by polynomial f can be expressed by the polynomial
is the j-th derivative of f and r j , F j are random polynomials of degree deg(f (j) ) and F j is chosen such that no roots of F j are elements of the overall domain R. Each element a occurring y times in S with y ≥ 0 occurs max{y − t, 0} times in the resulting multiset. The correctness of these polynomial representations is proven in [10] . Additionally, the authors in [10] show that one cannot learn more information about the initial multisets observing the result of the operations on polynomials than what can be deduced from the result of applying the operations on the multisets directly.
Encrypted Polynomial Operations. Assuming a semantically secure homomorphic encryption function E, it is possible to compute the sum of two encrypted polynomials, the derivative of an encrypted polynomial, and the product of an unencrypted polynomial and an encrypted polynomial without knowledge of the plaintext coefficients of the encrypted polynomials in which a polynomial f of degree d is represented by its coefficients 
Adversary Model
In this paper, we consider the honest-but-curious adversary model, which is also referred to as the semi-honest model [6] . In the semi-honest model all parties act according to the prescribed actions in the protocols. They may, however, try to infer as much information as possible from all results obtained during the execution of the protocol. Consequently, a protocol is said to be privacypreserving in the semi-honest model, if no party gains any information about the other party's private input other than what can be deduced from the output of the protocol and its own private input. While not the strongest model possible, the semi-honest model is suitable for all applications in which none of the parties is more ill-intended than just being curious. For example, in the advanced Doodle application where the parties are simply interested in finding a common time for a meeting, it is reasonable to assume that none of the parties has any purely malicious intend.
Multi-party Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation of Ordered Sets
We start with a description of our new protocols for privacy-preserving, preference-maximizing reconciliation of ordered sets for two or more parties. We start with a more formal definition of such reconciliation protocols. In the following, we focus on the combined preference order composition schemes minimum of ranks and sum of ranks (see Section 3.1). We first present a new protocol (for both preference order composition schemes) which generalizes the round-based construction (see Section 3.3) for multiple parties. Then, we detail our new multiset-based construction for multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets. This eliminates the need for a round-based proceeding thus resulting in a substantial improvement in efficiency in the case of more than six parties.
Round-Based Constructions
The main idea in generalizing the round-based privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets construction (see Section 3.3) is to use the multi-party set intersection protocol Set-Intersection-HbC (see Section 3.4) to compute the intersection of one-element subsets of each party's inputs. This is done in such a way that the order in which the intersections are computed ensures that the first non-empty intersection found contains the element that maximizes the combined preference order under the respective preference order composition scheme.
Minimum of Ranks Composition Scheme.
The n parties participate in a multi-round protocol where each round consists of one or more executions of a multi-party set intersection protocol with varying inputs. In the first round, party P i 's input set contains its most preferred element r i1 . In each of the following rounds s = 2, . . . , k, the parties participate in s n − (s − 1) n protocol runs of Set-Intersection-HbC. Each run of Set-Intersection-HbC takes a one-element subset of the inputs of each party as input. The order in which the parties select the inputs is determined such that in round s the maximum of the minimum of ranks of all of the input sets is k − s + 1 (see Figure 1 for details) . If the result of Set-Intersection-HbC is the empty set, then the parties proceed with the next input values. Otherwise, the protocol terminates and each party learns the preferred element according to the maximum of the minimum of ranks composition scheme and the round in which the match was found. Since the input sets to each run of the multi-party set intersection only contain one element, the input sets can be represented as polynomials of degree one. As a consequence, Fig. 1 . Minimum of ranks composition scheme with three parties and four input elements for the first two rounds. In Round 1, the minimum of ranks is four. In Round 2, the minimum of ranks is three which results in seven different input combinations.
the performance of the round-based approach is dominated by the number of runs of Set-Intersection-HbC. In the worst-case, i.e., if the parties do not share any element, all possible combinations of the k input elements of the n parties result in the execution of Set-Intersection-HbC. Therefore, in the worst-case the overall number of executions of Set-Intersection-HbC is k n . The communication complexity of one run of the Set-Intersection-HbC protocol with multisets of size one is O(c · n) (c is the number of colluding attackers) [10] . The same holds for the computation complexity. Thus, in the worst-case, the overall communication and computation complexity of the round-based multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets approach is O(c · n · k n ).
Sum of Ranks Composition Scheme.
Analogous to the minimum of ranks composition scheme, it is possible to generalize the round-based reconciliation protocols for multiple parties. The multi-party protocol requires at most (n·k)− (n − 1) rounds. Each round entails a number of runs of Set-Intersection-HbC. Specifically, in round s, the inputs r iji with i = 1, ..., n for the different runs of Set-Intersection-HbC are determined such that s = n i=1 rank Pi (r iji ) where the j i are chosen from {1, ..., k}. Again, as long as the result of Set-Intersection-HbC is the empty set, the parties proceed with the next input values. Otherwise, the protocol terminates and each party learns the preferred policy rule according to the maximum of the sum of ranks composition scheme and the round in which the match was found. As the maximum number of runs of Set-Intersection-HbC is again equal to k n , the overall communication and computation complexities of the round-based multi-party, privacy-preserving reconciliation of ordered sets approach for the sum of ranks composition scheme are O(c · n · k n ) in the worst-case.
Some Remarks.
Combining the results in [13] and [10] directly provides for the new protocols being privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model. It is important to note that based on the constructions described in Section 3.3, it is possible to achieve a slightly stronger privacy guarantee than that of Definition 4.1. This is due to the fact that the protocols are designed to abort as soon as the first match is found. The protocols could be easily modified to output all maximizing rules found in one round. Furthermore, the Set-Intersection-HbC protocol used in both constructions above may be replaced with any other privacy-preserving, multi-party set intersection protocol.
Multiset-Based Constructions
It would be nice if there were a more efficient solution than the round-based construction detailed above. The idea was to find a way to encode preferences as part of the inputs directly (instead of in the order in which the parties compare their inputs). It turns out that a good candidate for this approach is using multisets and encoding the rank of an input as the number of times which the input occurs in the multiset. Now the question is if one can find a way to represent the inner workings of the preference order composition scheme in the powerful grammar for privacy-preserving set operations proposed in [10] -i.e., if one can find a way to express maximizing the preferences according to the preference composition scheme in question by means of intersection, union, and reduction operations. As we will see, expressing the minimum of ranks composition scheme in this grammar is surprisingly easy, while expressing the sum of ranks composition scheme is by far not that straightforward. In particular, we show that our constructions yield functions which are not supported by prior developed protocols (see Section 3.4.) and thus require the design of new protocols.
Analogous to the work in [10] , we assume that at most c < n of the n parties collude. Furthermore, (k pub , k priv ) denotes a public/private key pair for the asymmetric, semantically secure, homomorphic threshold cryptosystem. Each party P i holds an authentic copy of the public key k pub as well as its share s i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of the private key k priv . The shares s 1 , . . . , s n are generated by means of a suitable (n, n)-secret sharing scheme, e. g. [16] . (i = 1, . . . , n) we represent its input elements together with their respective ranks as the multiset
Minimum of Ranks Composition Scheme. For each party P i
I.e., each element occurs in S i as often as its rank indicates such that the most preferred element r i1 occurs k times while the least preferred element r ik occurs only once. Using the grammar and basic operations described in Section 3.4, we now show that if it is possible to compute
(where k > t ≥ 0 is an appropriate reduction value) in a privacy-preserving manner, then this yields a multi-party, privacy-preserving reconciliation protocol of ordered sets for the minimum of ranks composition scheme − also referred to as MPROS MR . Intuitively speaking, for the computation of Equation (2) the protocol entails the following steps:
1. Each party determines the polynomial representation of its multiset S i . 2. All parties calculate the set intersection which is based on oblivious polynomial evaluation on input sets S 1 , ..., S n . After this step, all parties hold an encrypted polynomial that represents S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n . This intersection encodes not only the elements which the parties have in common but also the respective minimum preference for each of these elements over all the participants. 3. All parties iteratively calculate the element reduction by t. The first time this step is executed the reduction value t = k − 1 is used. The reduction operation is applied on the result of the set intersection from the previous step. The goal of the reduction step is to determine the rule in the intersection S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n for which the minimum preference is maximized, i.e., to perform element reduction using the largest possible t. A reduction by t eliminates up to t occurrences of each unique element in the multiset S 1 ∩...∩S n . If t is too large, the reduction will output the encryption of a polynomial representing the empty set.
There are n parties P1, ..., Pn of which at most c < n collude as attackers. F0, ..., Ft are fixed polynomials of degree 0, ..., k − 1 that do not have any elements of the overall domain R as root. + 1 random polynomials qi,0, ..., qi,c of degree deg(fi(X) 4. All parties participate in the threshold decryption of the result of the previous step. Specifically, each party checks whether at least one of its input elements is a root of the polynomial computed as part of the previous step. This will not be the case until the previous step results in a non-empty set which in turn corresponds to the maximum of the minimum of ranks. As long as the previous step yields an empty set, the parties iterate Steps 3 and 4 with a decreasing value of t. Figure 2 details each of the steps of this new protocol. The n parties P 1 , ..., P n are arranged in a ring structure. To increase readability, we generally omit the necessary mod n in the protocol description. For example, the P for an arbitrary is in fact the shorthand for P mod n . Note that in the resulting polynomial p (Step 4), each contributing polynomial f i is blinded by c + 1 random values. Consequently, the corresponding sum c j=0 q i+j,j is uniformly distributed and up to c colluding attackers cannot deduce any information from it. The same holds for polynomial Φ (Step 6).
Set Intersection 1. Each party Pi
In Step 7, each party checks if the multiset represented by the polynomial Φ contains one of its input elements. If this is the case, the protocol terminates and the elements that maximize the combined preferences of all parties are found. If this is not the case, the parties reduce the value t by one and repeat Steps 5b-7.
Correctness and Privacy. The above protocol first executes the multiset intersection operation followed by a sequence of element reductions. The multisets S i of each party P i are constructed in a way such that the intersection of the multisets leads to a multiset in which each common element r of the n parties occurs exactly min{rank P1 (r), . . . , rank P1 (r)} times. Obviously, the maximum of the minimum of ranks of the common elements is between k and 1. As a consequence, if the element reduction by k − 1 of the multiset resulting from the intersection leads to a non-empty set of common input elements, then the rank of these elements maximizes the minimum of ranks. If the reduction by k − 1 leads to an empty set, the maximum of the minimum of ranks is lower than k. Continuing this argument with an iterative reduction by k−2,...,0 proves the correctness of our construction. In our protocol, each party P i learns all maximally preferred common elements 1 and the value t corresponding to the reduction in which these rules were found 2 . In order to prove that the new protocol is privacy-preserving in the semihonest model, we can directly build on the results by Kissner et al. [10] . They show that in the presence of at most c colluding attackers, their multiset operations (union, intersection, and element reduction) are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model and that these operations can be arbitrarily composed in a privacy-preserving manner. As our protocol combines the intersection with several element reduction operations, it is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model in the presence of at most c attackers as well. A detailed performance analysis of the protocol can be found in Section 5.
Sum of Ranks Composition Scheme.
We once again represent the input elements of each party P i (i = 1, . . . , n) together with their respective ranks as the multiset
In addition, we define
Using the grammar and basic operations described in Section 3.4, we now show that if it is possible to compute
There are n parties P1, ..., Pn of which at most c < n collude as attackers. F0, ..., Ft are fixed polynomials of degree 0, ..., nk − 1 that do not have any elements of the overall domain R as root. scheme (see Figure 2 ) to calculate S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n using polynomials in a privacy-preserving manner, then this yields a multi-party privacy-preserving reconciliation protocol of ordered sets for the sum of ranks composition scheme− also referred to as MPROS SR . It is also important to note that the seemingly simpler construction Rd t (S 1 ∪ ... ∪ S n ) does not lead to the desired type of protocol. This is due to the fact that after applying the union operation to the multisets, there may be elements in the union that are in fact not common to all parties. Using the additional intersection with S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n eliminates this problem. The maximum multiplicity of a rule in the union S 1 ∪ ... ∪ S n is n · k. In turn, S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n contains all those elements with a multiplicity of n · k which all parties have in common. Thus, (S 1 ∪...∪S n )∩S 1 ∩...∩S n not only eliminates those elements that are not held by all parties but it also preserves the preferences with which the common input elements are held. Intuitively speaking, the protocol implementing Equation (3) works as follows:
Set union 1. Each party Pi
(i = 1, ..., n) calculates the polynomial fi(X) = (X − ri1) k · (X − ri2) k−1 · ... · (X − r ik ) 1 with deg(fi(X)) = k·(k+1) 2 .
Party
1. Each party calculates polynomial representations of the multisets S i and S i . 2. All parties calculate the set union on their input multisets S 1 , . . . , S n . After completing this step, all parties hold an encrypted polynomial that represents S 1 ∪ ... ∪ S n . This union encodes not only all the input elements that are held by the parties but it also represents the sum of the preferences for each element across all parties.
3. All parties calculate the set intersection operation on input sets S 1 , . . . , S n and the outcome of the previous Step 2. This step is necessary in order to ensure that those elements are eliminated from S 1 ∪ ... ∪ S n which are held by some but not all parties. 4. All parties iteratively participate in the element reduction by t with t = nk − 1, ..., n − 1 on the result of the previous Step 3. As in the case of the multi-party, privacy-preserving protocol for the minimum of ranks composition scheme, the purpose of this step is to maximize the preference order. This is ensured by possibly repeating this step and the following step for decreasing t. 5. All parties participate in the threshold decryption of the result of Step 4 and check whether at least one of its input elements is a root of the polynomial computed in the previous step. If this is the case, the common elements with the maximal sum of ranks are found. If this is not the case (i.e., t was too large and the polynomial computed as part of
Step 4 corresponds to the empty set), the parties repeat
Step 4 with a value t decreased by one. Correctness and Privacy. The above protocol combines the multiset union with the multiset intersection operation and multiple element reduction operations.
Steps 1-4 correspond to the union operation on n multisets which, by construction (see Section 3.4), returns a multiset containing each rule r exactly s times where s is the sum of the occurrences of r in each input set. As mentioned above, this multiset may contain rules that are not shared by all parties. Intersecting the result of the union operation with the intersection of the multisets S i eliminates these non-shared rules while preserving the (sum of the) preferences. To obtain the rules that maximize the sum of ranks of all parties, we apply the reduction step, this time starting with t = nk − 1 since the maximum possible sum of the assigned rank for a rule is nk. Assuming a rule r occurring d times in (S 1 ∪ ... ∪ S n ) ∩ S 1 ∩ ... ∩ S n , the reduction by t (see Section 3.4) returns all elements that appear max{d − t, 0} times. Due to the order in which the reduction is applied (i.e., for decreasing t ≥ n − 1), the correctness of the protocol is guaranteed. In our protocol, each party P i learns all maximally preferred common input elements and the value t corresponding to the reduction in which these rules were found. In order to prove that the new protocol is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model, we can build on the results by Kissner et al. [10] . They show that in the presence of at most c colluding attackers, their multiset operations (union, intersection, and element reduction) are privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model and that these operations can be arbitrarily composed in a privacy-preserving manner. As our protocol combines the union and the intersection with several element reduction operations, it is privacy-preserving in the semi-honest model in the presence of at most c attackers as well. A performance analysis of the protocol can be found in Section 5.
Performance Comparison
In this section, we compare the performance of our new protocols for the roundbased and the multiset-based approaches. Due to space limitations, the details of how we obtained these performance results are provided in the extended version of the paper. Table 1 summarizes the computational complexity in terms of encryption, decryption and homomorphic operations on ciphertexts and the communication overhead in the number of ciphertexts for the newly-developed protocols, including the two-party versions of our protocols. Recall that k denotes the number of input elements, n the number of parties, c the maximum number of colluding attackers and l the security parameter. All complexities are based on a worst-case analysis in the semi-honest model. Our newly-developed multiset-based protocols are polynomial-time bounded with respect to the number of parties and input elements, whereas the round-based constructions have exponential runtime with respect to the number of parties. Furthermore, the table shows that for more than three parties the communication overhead of the multiset-based protocols is smaller than the communication overhead of the round-based approach. For more than five parties the computation overhead of the multiset-based protocol for the minimum of ranks composition scheme is smaller than that of the round-based construction. For the sum of ranks composition scheme this holds for more than six parties. 
u l t i -p a r t y
Obviously, our current multiset-based construction has limitations w.r.t. scalability for an increasing number of rules k each party holds. Especially for time-critical applications the practical benefit of our solution is expected to be limited. However, for less time-sensitive applications that allow an upper bound regarding the participating parties and number of rules (like in the Doodle case), our solutions are expected to perform reasonably well considering the fact that our solutions are polynomial-time bounded with respect to the number of parties n and the number of rules k. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other (more efficient) solutions for fair privacy-preserving reconciliation that consider the parties' preferences that allow for maximizing them.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed four new protocols for privacy-preserving, fair reconciliation of ordered sets for multiple parties. As a next step, we plan to implement and test the performance of our new protocols. In this context, we plan to compare different homomorphic cryptosystems w.r.t. their efficiency. In addition, we will explore some potential optimizations such as finding a way to pre-compute the threshold value t in order to eliminate the iterative reduction steps in the multiset-based constructions. This may lead to a considerable performance improvement of our protocols. Furthermore, we will investigate whether it is possible to modify the multiset-based protocols such that the protocol output is limited to one and not all possible results.
